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Abstract
This essay attempts to study the negative features of 
politics in Augustine’s The City of God (De Civitate Dei). 
Augustine is not an anarchist who believes that the state 
and the authority are an irreplaceable tool to maintain 
peace. However, Augustine’s thought has no place in the 
vision of a politics of perfection, in which all-wise rulers 
devise truly good and lasting solution for social problems 
and in which contented subjects live together in stable 
harmony. Politics is a realm in which fallible, sinful men 
work out imperfect, precarious solutions to recurring 
difficulties and tension. He thinks state and coercive are 
a result of human sinfulness. All coercive power like 
the institutions of property and slavery, was a divinely 
sanctioned remedy and punishment for sin. Augustine also 
made a new definition of the “Republic”. He leaves just 
out of his definition of the republic entirely and to accept 
a minimalist and amoral description.
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INTRODUCTION
The age in which St. Augustine lived was a period of 
profound disturbances, marking the transition from 
the classical civilization of Greece and Rome to the 
Christian civilization of Western Europe. Augustine, heir 
to the classical civilization of Western Europe and great 
Christian philosopher and theologian, is the between 
the thought of antiquity and that of the Middle Ages; 
indeed, he can be regarded as an important link between 
classical culture and the Christian civilization which, 
having dominated Europe from the fifth century until our 
own times, may now be coming to its end. Therefore, to 
discuss the political theory of Augustine is necessary for 
theoretical and empirical value. 
One view is that in Augustine’s view politics are 
negative: State and coercive social power is based neither 
on nature nor on justice; it is rather a condition of slavery 
caused by sin. Augustine sees political life as such as a 
part of the good creation of God, but political authority 
is not based on this inherent goodness of social life. 
The typical representatives of this view are Brown and 
Markus. Brown thinks that civil life requires obedience; 
and since, at least in practice, that involves domination, 
the view Augustine takes of this matter is “strictly 
analogous to Augustine’s view of illness” (Brown, 1965, 
pp.1-21). Markus holds the same view: 
Because civil institutions are a necessary response to sin, they 
are not something natural in the full sense; in the end civil life 
is theologically neutral and serves ephemeral ends; it constitutes 
“an area of intrinsically” between the City of God and the City 
of this world. (Markus, 1970, p.64)
On the contrary, another view is that politics a 
positive in Augustine’ thought: Politics itself is good, and 
is in accord with human nature. This view which was 
represented by Burnell and Heyking. Burnell believes that 
civil society is the chief natural organ of voluntary action. 
In this respect, too, Augustine is highly classical. Heyking 
thinks that political life as the mode by which human 
beings satisfy their longings for a kind of wholeness, 
which political society serves as a kind of microcosm of 
the way its citizens perceive reality. “The political city is 
the best practical regime as understood and governed by 
natural reason” (Heyking, 2003, p12).
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The author believes that the latter view can make up 
for the deficiency of the previous view to a certain extent. 
However, politics is generally negative in Augustine’s 
thought, so the latter explanation already deviated from 
Augustine’s thought. This essay will elaborate on the 
negative features of Augustine’s political thought in 
several aspects.
1. WHY THE STATE IS NECESSARY?
The central theme of Augustine’ realistic political theory 
is that sate exists to maintain earthly peace so that men 
can live and work together and attain the objects that 
are necessary for their earthly existence. “Peace” is 
an important concept in The City of God Augustine. 
Augustine points to be a “well-ordered concord” in 
which obedience follows from a rational conception of 
permanent and mutual interests and not from fear and 
repression. “The peace of all things lies in the tranquility 
of order and order is the disposition of equal and unequal 
things in such a way as to give to each its proper place” 
(The City of God, 19:13).
Augustine thinks that, on the basis of nature of human 
beings, all men have some longing for peace. A clear 
distinction remains in Augustine’s considered between the 
peace of the God’s city and the terrestrial city. The peace 
of the terrestrial city is based on “libido dominance”  and 
subjection of the people. Therefore, that peace has the 
characteristic of lust perverts the good order of nature. On 
the contrary, the peace of the city of God is perfect peace, 
and it is an object of Christian hope. However, the citizen 
of god’s city, in its pilgrimage, is intermingled in this 
world with the citizens of the opposite of the terrestrial 
city. Some kind earthly peace, at least a minimum of 
social order, is a realizable goal and aim to the citizens 
both of the city of God and the terrestrial city. “For the 
time being, however, it is advantageous to us also that this 
people should have such peace in this life; for, while the 
two cities are intermingled, we also make use of the peace 
of Babylon by faith, so that it is only for a while that we 
are pilgrims in her midst” (Ibid.). The earthly peace is of 
common concern to all, whether citizens of the heavenly 
or earthly cities. 
Therefore, “peace” is an area where coercive 
institutions can function. Augustine points this out from 
the fact that all men desire peace, and without authority 
there can be no peace as even the wicked man knows. “He 
employs harsh measures to impose upon his household a 
peace which, he believe, cannot exist unless all the other 
members of the society are subject to one head; and this 
head, in his own house, is himself” (The City of God, 
19:12). Moreover the rule of authority is so requisite as to 
be indispensable, and those that would do away with the 
just rule of God must substitute a rule of their own, unjust 
though it is. “Thus, pride is a perverted imitation of God. 
For pride hates a fellowship of equality under God, and 
wishes to impose its own dominion upon its equals, in 
place of God’s rule” (Ibid.).
The necessity of coercive authority is further 
manifested by the order and law which obtain in heaven 
and on earth. Augustine describes how there is an order 
permeating the world: 
The peace of the body, therefore, lies in the balanced ordering 
of its parts; the peace of the irrational soul lies in the rightly 
ordered disposition of the appetites; the peace of the rational 
soul lies in the rightly ordered life and health of a living 
creature; peace between mortal man and god is an ordered 
obedience, in faith, under an eternal law; and peace between 
men is an ordered agreement of mind with mind. The peace of 
a household is an ordered concord, with respect to command 
and obedience, of those who dwell together; the peace of a city 
is an ordered concord with respect to command and obedience, 
of the citizens; and the peace of the Heavenly City is a perfectly 
ordered and perfectly harmonious fellowship  in the enjoyment 
of God and of on another in God. (The City of God, 19:13) 
Though Augustine in this passage is speaking of order 
in the universe, and says nothing directly of authority, yet 
we must observe that the two concepts are inseparable. 
Where in order, there must also be authority, that is to 
say an agent with power to order. Augustine recognizes 
an order, an authority, in the family, in the state, in man 
himself, in fact underlying and permeating the universe. 
So extensive is this order that he will let none escape its 
influence; not even those who cut themselves off from 
its peace and tranquility. “Precisely because of their 
misery, however, even they cannot be said to lie beyond 
the sphere of order; for they are miserable deservedly and 
justly” (Iibd.).
2. THE STATE IS THE RESULT OF THE 
FALL OF HUMANITY
According to classical political thinkers, such as 
Aristotle, it is “by nature” that man is political animal. 
Aristotle argues that it is our nature to govern and be 
governed, and that any creature of whom this is not true 
is either greater than human or less than human (Aristotle, 
Politics, 1253a25). This is so because our moral goodness 
can be completed only in and through the formative 
processes that life in a political community makes 
possible. Politics is therefore called the “master science”: 
The science means that almost everything happens in 
political context, that the decisions of the polis (the Greek 
city-state) governed most other things. For Augustine, 
by contrast, the master science is theology, and theology, 
as based on the Bible, tells us that the domination and 
slavery of human being were not part of God’s plan in 
creating the world. His intention was that individuals 
should govern themselves by the light given to them by 
Him in whose image they were made. God gave to Adam 
“dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of 
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the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the 
earth”; but 
He did not intend that His rational creature, made in His own 
image, should have lordship over the beats, Hence the first just 
men were established as shepherds of flocks, rather than as 
kings of men. This was done so that in this way also God might 
indicate what the order of nature requires, and what the desert 
of sinners demand. For we believe that it is with justice that a 
condition of servitude is imposed on the sinner. That is why we 
do not read the word “slave” anywhere in the Scriptures until 
Noah the just man, punished his son’s with this name. [….] By 
nature, then, in the condition in which God first created man, 
no man is the slave either of another man of sin. But it is also 
true that servitude itself is ordained as a punishment by that 
law which enjoins the preservation of the order of nature, and 
forbids its disruption. For if nothing had been done in violation 
of that law, there would have been no need for the discipline of 
servitude as a punishment. The apostle therefore admonishes 
servants to be obedient to their masters and to serve them loyally 
and with a good will, so that, if they cannot be freed by their 
masters, they can do this by serving not with cunning fear, but 
in faithful love, until all unrighteousness shall cease, and all 
authority and power be put down, that god may be all in all. (The 
City of God, 19:15)
This passage clearly shows that human beingis free and 
equal in their original condition. Neither the need nor the 
wish to be involved in political relationships is a defining 
part of what it is to be human. When the Bible tells us 
that man was made “in the image of God”, this plainly 
does not mean that he resembles God in appearance. It 
means that he was made as a rational creature. Equality 
is the condition natural to human beings because it is the 
condition appropriate to creatures who share in the Divine 
property of reason. 
According to classical political philosophy, human 
are naturally unequal. The true function of the state or 
government is to make men into better men so that the 
better and the more developed. In the political of Plato, 
the stronger part of a society should benefit the weaker 
part, the ruler serve the people. Cicero puts forward a 
similar idea of the natural right of rule: kings, magistrates, 
commanders, and senators govern the citizens as god 
rules man, the mind governs the body, and reason rules 
lusts—this is Cicero’s definition of justice. The right of 
the superior in ability wisdom, virtue, and wealth to rule 
the inferior is objectively based on the law of nature on 
a small scale in the family and on a larger scale in the 
commonwealth. 
Do we not observe that dominion has been granted by nature to 
everything that is best, to the great advantage of what is weak? 
For why else does God rule over man, the mind over the body, 
and reason over lust over the body, and also lust; but it rules over 
the body as a king governs his subjects or a father his children, 
whereas is rules over lust as a master rules his slaves, restraining 
it and breaking its power. So kings commanders, magistrates, 
senators, and popular assemblies govern citizens as the mind 
governs the body. (De rep. 3:25)
In contrast, Augustine would say that coercive political 
power structures exist, not by spiritual nature, but sin. 
Human being is sociable creatures by nature, but they 
are not naturally. All forms of rule came into being after 
the fall. If Adam had not fallen, coercive authority would 
not have arisen. It would not have arisen because the 
psychological forces that generate and sustain political 
activity would have been absent. Life in political society, 
in subjection to rulers and coercive institutions is—like 
slavery and other forms of dominion—the result of man’s 
fall, and its purpose is to limit the disorder and conflict 
attendant upon it. On this view, the coercive power is 
concerned, not to help man to achieve the right order, but 
to minimise disorder. As Carlyle pointed out, 
Man is by nature made for society. But it is not by nature 
that man is the lord of man, it is not by nature that man is in 
subjection to man. […] The government of man by man is 
not part of the natural order of the world. In another place 
St Augustine speaks in the severest terms of the desire for 
domination, and treats it as arising from an intolerable pride 
which forgets that men are each others’ equal. (Carlyle, 1903, 
p.126)
On the one hand, the state originates from the fall of 
mankind, so the state can be regarded as a punishment. 
On the other hand, the state can also be used to prevent 
human being form committing more crimes, so the sate is 
also a remedy. Although coercive power is neither natural 
nor just, God, however, can use it for good purposes, for 
the restriction of social abuses. Before the Fall, the most 
and the deterioration and disturbance of that creation by 
sin. Before the Fall, the most beautiful crown of God’s 
creative activity in the human world was the peace and 
order social life; correspondingly, the most detestable evil 
in the world is caused by the perversion of that good: “For 
the human race is, more than any other species, at once 
social by nature and quarrelsome by perversion” (The City 
of God, 12:28).
Human beings has never lost his desire for peace. 
The earthly city, which does not live by faith, desires an earthly 
peace, and it establishes an ordered concord of civic obedience 
and rule in order to secure a kind of co-operation of men’s wills 
for the sake of attaining the secure a kind of co-operation of 
men’s will for the sake of attaining the thing’s which belong to 
this mortal life. (The City of God, 19:17).
Because of the distorted wills and loves of the human 
being, and the conflicts that arise among them, the objects 
of state or government must be limited.
Although the establishment of state and government 
is caused by sin , God does not will to abolish it until 
the end of this “saeculum”. Coercive social power is a 
part of the penal existence of mankind; and furthermore, 
it is a remedy for sin, a means by which God limits the 
disaster of total social chaos which would be the case 
if everyone could freely maximize his lust for rule. The 
business of government is not the promotion of the good 
life, or virtue, or perfection, but the more modest task 
of cancelling out at least some of the effects of sin. Its 
function, summarily stated, is to resolve some of the 
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tensions in society and to contain those that cannot be 
resolved. In the condition of radical insecurity—“this hell 
on earth”—political authority exists “to safeguard security 
and sufficiency”. All the institutions of political and 
judicial authority and their administrative and coercive 
agencies serve this object: That the wicked be held in 
check and the good given a space to live in innocence 
(Burns, 1988, p.148).
3. AUGUSTINE’S REDEFINITION OF 
“REPUBLIC”
The negative understanding of politics is also reflected in 
the removal of justice from the definition of the Republic. 
Augustine introduces at length in the second book of The 
City of God the political thought of Cicero, quoting those 
parts of Cicero’s De re publica where Roman author puts 
forward an argument that without “iustitia” no “res public” 
can exist. This is an idea which Cicero shares with Plato, 
in his Republic Plato is of the opinion that justice is not 
only the foundation of a commonwealth, but justice itself 
can become a reality only in a political state. Augustine 
describes Cicero’s argument further by representing the 
popular opinion, expressed in Cicero’s work by Philus, 
that some injustice is inevitable in the government of any 
state. But in spite of that, the real foundation of political 
society is justice. 
Using Scipio as his mouthpiece, Cicero establishes 
his position, according to which it is not possible to rule 
a state without justice. According to Cicero, complete 
justice is the supreme essential for government. 
Now Scipio, at the end of the second book, says: Among the 
different sounds of lyres or flutes and the voices of singers, 
a certain harmony must be maintained which the cultivated 
ear cannot bear disrupted or discordant; and such harmony, 
concordant and consistent, may be brought about by the 
balancing of even the most dissimilar voices. So too, when the 
highest, lowest and, between them, the intermediate orders of 
society are balanced by reason as though they quite dissimilar 
elements. What musicians call harmony in singing is concord in 
the city, which is the most artful and best bond of security in the 
commonwealth, and which, without justice, cannot be secured at 
all. (The City of God, 2:21) 
After representing the above dialogue, Augustine turns 
Cicero’s proper definition of a republic. The basic 
assumption is that the concept of political society must 
be based on the idea of the well-being of the people. The 
definition of “Res publica” presumes the definition of 
“res populi”. In fact, as we shall see, in The City of God 
Augustine fully agrees with Ciero on that the definition of 
a republic and commonwealth is based on the concept of 
the common good of a people.
With Scipio as his mouthpiece, Cicero gives his 
fundamental definition of political society: 
Scipio return s to his in interrupted theme and recalls and 
commends his own brief definition of a commonwealth, which 
he had said to be “the property of a people”. “A people” he 
defines as being not every assembly of a multitude, but an 
assembly united in fellowship by common agreement as to what 
is right and by a community of interest. (Ibid.) 
According to Augustine’s interpretation of Cicero, the 
idea of justice is the fundamental constituent of the 
definition of the concept of a people and thus of a republic 
or commonwealth. Only justice can fulfill the requirement 
of “common agreement as to what is right and by a 
community of interest”.
In his De legibus Cicero makes it clear that “iustitia” 
is the main requirement of the constitution of any 
commonwealth. He says that Plato was right when he 
condemned the man who first separated utility from 
justice. Without the idea of eternal natural justice, law is 
nothing but products of human opinions which run the risk 
of perversion and misuse. Justice is the basic condition, no 
matter whether the form of a commonwealth is a kingdom 
or an aristocratic or a democratic republic. Augustine in a 
very basic sense anchors Cicero’s idea of political society 
in the fact of “iustitia” which must be a reality in the 
community in question. He explains the basic definition of 
Cicero: 
He then explains the great advantage of definition in debate, 
and he infers from these definitions of his own that a 
commonwealth—that is, the property of people—exists when it 
is well and justly governed either by a single king, or by a few 
of the highest men, or by the people at large. But when the king 
is unjust (or a tyrant, as he put it, after the Greek fashion), or the 
highest men are unjust (he called a union of such men a “faction”) 
or the people itself is unjust (in this case he found no term in 
current use; although he might have called the people itself a 
“tyrant” then the commonwealth is not mere flawed, as had been 
argued the day before. Rather, as the conclusions entailed by 
Scipio’s definitions would indicate, it entirely ceases to be. For 
it could not be “the property of a people”, he said, when a tyrant 
or a faction took possession of it. Moreover, the people itself 
would no longer be a people if it were unjust: For it would no 
longer answer to the definition of a people as a multitude united 
in fellowship by common agreement as to what is right and by a 
community of interest. (Ibid.)
It is very much in Augustine’s interest to demonstrate 
that Cicero’ line of argument ends in contradiction of 
itself. We saw how Augustine referred to Sallust in order 
to show how the Roman authors themselves admitted 
that the moral condition of the Roman republic was 
“utterly wiced and dissolute”. Now Augustine refers with 
the same intention to Cicero, trying to demonstrate that 
Rome as miserable and looks back to the earlier history 
of Rome with nostalgia. Augustine, who does not share 
Cicero’s or Sallust’s nostalgia for the old virtues Rome, 
also has no belief in Imperial revival. Augustine reaches 
this drastic conclusion: Because true justice never had a 
place in Rome—on the contrary, Rome was founded on 
violence, fratricide, and lust for domination—a republic 
or a commonwealth in terms defined by Cicero never 
existed in Rome. “A commonwealth never existed, 
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because there never was true justice in the community” 
(Ibid.).
But this is not the end of the discussion. Augustine 
makes a promising remark: In spite of coming to a dead 
end with the definition of political society based on the 
concept of justice, “accepting more feasible definitions of 
a republic, I grant there was a republic of a certain kind.” 
Augustine gives a hing that he will present an alternative 
definition of political society, not based on the principle 
of justice, because true justice is a transcendental idea, 
not a concept appropriate for a definition of a people and 
a commonwealth. The definition of a commonwealth, 
must be based on premise other than the idea of true of 
absolute justice. 
There was, of course, according to a more practicable 
definition, a commonwealth of a sort; and it was certainly better 
administered by the Romans of more ancient times than by 
those who have come after them. True justice, however, does 
not exist other than in that commonwealth whose Founder and 
Ruler is Christ. You may indeed call it a commonwealth if you 
like, for we cannot deny that it is “the property of a people”. 
But it this name, which has become familiar in other places 
and circumstances, is perhaps too remote from our customary 
manner of speaking, we can at least say that there is true justice 
in that City of which Holy Scripture says: Glorious things are 
spoken of thee. O City of God. (Ibid.)
In book 19 of The City of God, Augustine returns 
to the great discussion on the concept of republic with 
Ciceronian and finally, in book 19, 24, gives his own 
alternative basic definition. In the beginning of this second 
discussion with Cicero on the idea of republic, Augustine 
first repeats what he had said in book 2, 21, on the basis 
of Cicero’s definition, there never was a Roman republic 
because the property of the people, was never attained 
among the Romans. Thereafter Augustine repeats the 
kernel of Cicero’s definition: 
If this is a true definition, however, there never was a Roman 
commonwealth, for the roman state was never “the property of 
a people” which the definition requires a commonwealth to be 
Scipio defined a “people” as a multitude “united in fellowship 
by common agreement as to what is right and by a community 
of interest”. (Ibid.)
In Augustine’s interpretation of Cicero, “vera iustitia” 
is presupposed in every treatment of the concept of justice. 
Without true justice, no right or true laws could exist; 
right flows from the fountain of justice. Augustine lets his 
readers understand that the definition of commonwealth by 
Cicero also presumes such a transcendental idea of justice: 
“He explains what he means by ‘common agreement as 
to what is right’, showing that a commonwealth cannot be 
maintained without justice. Where therefore, there is no 
true justice there can be no right” (Ibid.). On the basis of 
this, Augustine concludes: 
Where there is no true justice, then, there can be no association 
of men “united in fellowship by common agreement as to what 
is right”, and therefore no people according to the definition 
of Scipio or Cicero. And if there is no people then there is no 
“property of people” but only a multitude of some kind, not 
worthy of the name of a people, and if therefore, a common 
wealth is “the property of a people” and if there is no “people” 
where there is no “common agreement as to what is right” and if 
there is no right where there is no justice, then it follows beyond 
doubt that where there is no justice there is no commonwealth. 
(Ibid.)
Augustine’s line of interpretation is clear. The idea of 
“ius” in Cicero’s definition cannot but be based on the 
category of “vera iustita”. According to the statement 
of the Roman author, people is defined by reference 
of the common sense of right and, therefore, to true 
justice; without true justice there is no people. Republic 
or Commonwealth is defined in terms of the property of 
the people. If there is no people, based on the common 
sense of right, there is no property of the people and, 
consequently, no commonwealth. If “vera ustita” does no 
exist, the whole line of Cicero’ argumentation collapses, 
Augustine believes. 
In book 19, 21 Augustine does not yet deepen the 
discussion on the nature of political society; instead he 
brings up his apologetic tendency in trying to prove that 
the realization of “iustitia” is possible only in the true 
ordo amoris sub Deo, not in a false religion which is vain 
idolatry based on the perverse order of love. Thus he sets 
his motive of the theology of creation, perfected as an 
eschatological reality, over and against Cicero’s political 
thought.
Augustine emphasizes that “iustitia” may have some 
relevance to human life as a soteriological reality in the 
right relation to God; so justice is primarily no a question 
of natural morality but a question of true religion. Without 
a right relationship with God no justice, and therefore, no 
commonwealth based on justice exists: 
For if the soul does not serve God it cannot by any means govern 
the body justly, nor can human reason govern the vices. And if 
there is no justice in such a man, then it is beyond doubt that 
there is no justice in a collection of men consisting of persons 
of this kind. Here, then, there is not that “common agreement as 
to what is right” by which a multitude is made into a “people” 
whose “property” a commonwealth is said to be. (Ibid.)
So according to Augustine’s argumentation, it seems 
that accepting the Christina religion is the condition of for 
the realization of Cicero’s idea of the republic. Augustine 
expressly emphasizes the inseparable connection of 
iustitia with civitas Dei. Ciero’s idea of the Republic can 
become a reality only in terms of the city of God. But as 
this city is an object of faith and hope, even for a Christian 
vera iustitia is a eschatological reality which cannot be 
consummated on earth: 
Thus, justice is found where the one supreme God rules an 
obedient City according to His grace, so that it sacrifices to none 
but him; and where, in consequence, the soul rules the body in 
all men who belong to that City and obey God, and the reason 
faithfully rules the vices in lawful order. In that city, both the 
individual just man and the community and people of the just 
live by faith, which works by love: By that love with which 
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a man loves God as God ought to be loved, and his neighbor 
as himself. But where there is not this justice, there certainly 
is no association of men united by a common agreement as to 
what is right and by a community of interest. And so there is 
no commonwealth; for where there is no “people”, there is no 
“property of people”. (The City of God, 19:23)
“Populus”, people, is the concept chosen by Augustine 
for a definition of political society. Augustine accepts 
Cicero’s principle according to which a definition of 
political society is rooted in an adequate definition of 
people. An idea of people’s interest, “res populi”. In this 
sense, Augustine is as positive as Cicero: The foundation 
of political society must be in accordance with the good of 
the people. But in his definition in book 19, 24, showing 
how his good should be understood, Augustine differs 
drastically from Cicero.
The novelty of Augustine’s alternative definition of 
political society lies in his replacing Cicero’s idea of “iuris 
consensus utilitatis communio” with the concept of love 
using the verb “diligo”. Augustine understands political 
society as an association of rational beings bound together 
by a common agreement on the objects of their love: 
If we are to discover the character of any people, we have only 
to examine what is loves. If it is an assembled multitude, not 
of animals but of rational creatures, and is united by a common 
agreement as to what is loves, then it is not absurd to call it 
“people” no matter what the objects of its love may be. (The 
City of God, 19:24)
The verb “diligo” which Augustine employs in his 
definition of political society does not mean loving a high 
ideal. Instead, it is a concept of collective love for gain. 
In his definition in book 19, 24, Augustine uses the verb, 
the sense being neutral. But in regard to what hitherto 
has been said of his gloomy view of political life in the 
penal situation of fallen mankind, it is more likely that 
Augustine’s thought of love in this context is to be seen 
as non-idealistic, in relation to the condition of sin and 
its consequences which have disturbed the right order of 
love. According to Augustine, love is constitutive for the 
natural moral law as well. But because the doctrine of 
sin overwhelms his theological anthropology, Augustine 
understands the naturally good social life being heavily 
vitiated by sin. Love as a social phenomenon is by 
definition biased toward selfish love, an expression of 
collective selfishness. Neither benevolent love nor true 
justice, but such a love which is typical of the misery of 
social life, can be a foundation for a political society. There 
exists a remnant of the good ordo naturae in human life, 
but it has been put into turmoil by sin and is being misused 
by men for satisfying their own lust for rule.
CONCLUSION
Considered with respect to its origins and most typical 
purposes, the sate is both a result of sin and a continuing 
expression of sin. Like sickness, death and the other 
miseries of this world, it is a consequence of the fall. It 
expresses the change effected in human nature and the 
human will by the self-love of Human ancestor. The state 
is not, as it had been for Plato and Aristotle, a natural 
part of human life, nor is it a place for the realization of 
human character and potential. Augustine’s keen sense 
of the perpetual power of human pride and sinfulness 
compelled him to reject any hope that the future would 
bring enduring peace or progress. Both his theological 
beliefs and his experience and observation of men’s 
actions in an age of disorder enforced upon him an 
attitude of pessimistic realism, which would not allow 
him to sentimentalize or evade the darker aspects of social 
and political life. The business of government is not the 
promotion of the good life, or virtue, or perfection, but 
the more modest task of cancelling out at least some of 
the effects of sin. Its function, summarily stated, is to 
resolve some of the tensions in society and to contain 
those that cannot be resolved. In the condition of radical 
insecurity—“this hell on earth”—political authority exists 
“to safeguard security and sufficiency”. All the institutions 
of political and judicial authority and their administrative 
and coercive agencies serve this object: that the wicked 
be held in check and the good given a space to live in 
innocence (Burns, 1988, p148).
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